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Summary 
A piloted-simulation study was performed to 
evaluate the pilot interface with an automatic termi- 
nal approach system (ATAS). The ATAS was con- 
ceived as a concept for improving the pilot inter- 
face with high levels of automation. It consists of 
instrument approach data storage, automatic radio 
tuning, autopilot, autothrottle, and annunciation of 
flight status. These components allow the ATAS 
to automatically execute instrument approaches, in- 
cluding procedure turns, altitude changes, missed 
approaches, and holding patterns, without requir- 
ing the pilot to set up navigation radios or change 
autopilot modes. 
The results show that fewer pilot blunders were 
made during approaches when using the ATAS than 
when using a baseline, heading-select autopilot. With 
the baseline autopilot, blunders tended to involve loss 
of navigational situational awareness or instrument 
misreading, while with the ATAS, blunders tended to 
involve a lack of awareness of the ATAS mode state. 
The ATAS display provided adequate approach- 
status information to maintain navigational situa- 
tional awareness, and a side-task measure did not 
show any significant difference in pilot work load 
between the two levels of automation. 
Introduction 
General aviation instrument flight rules (IFR) ac- 
tivities currently involve approximately 18 million 
airport operations per year and are forecast by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to increase 
to about 30 million operations per year by 1993. 
Most of these operations are conducted by single- 
pilot crews. The air traffic control (ATC) system ex- 
pects all aircraft to perform at the same high level. 
The high IFR accident rate during the approach 
and landing phase of flight, as documented in ref- 
erence 1,  indicates that the required level of perfor- 
mance has not yet been achieved. It is thought that 
this level cannot be reached without improvements in 
aircraft handling qualities, displays, automatic flight 
control systems, weather information dissemination, 
training, and ATC procedures. 
The approach and landing is normally the phase 
of IFR flight with the highest work load. The pi- 
lot must navigate with greater precision than during 
the departure or en route phases. Air traffic con- 
trol communications and frequency changes are more 
numerous. The pilot must make frequent changes 
in aircraft altitude, heading, speed, and configura- 
tion while approaching the ground. Checklists must 
be accomplished and navigation charts frequently re- 
ferred to. The pilot is in a highly dynamic situation 
with a high potential for mistakes and has limited 
time to detect and correct any errors. A successful 
arrival depends on the correct interpretation of ap- 
proach chart details, the correct setting of numerous 
cockpit controls, and precise aircraft guidance near 
the ground. 
Automation in the form of an autopilot has been 
used to reduce pilot work load and improve pilot 
performance in the terminal area. Research studies 
(ref. 2) and airplane accident and incident reports 
suggest, however, that the probability of pilot error 
actually increases with an increase in automation, 
partially because of design limitations of the pilot- 
machine interface. Conventional autopilot interfaces 
provide the pilot with many opportunities to make 
errors because of the requirements to change radio 
frequencies and autopilot modes as the approach 
progresses. 
The automatic terminal approach system (ATAS) 
was developed to  study ways of significantly reduc- 
ing the likelihood of pilot error and the work load 
during terminal area operations by improving the 
pilot-machine interface. Elements of the ATAS are 
instrument approach data storage, automatic radio 
tuning, autopilot, and autothrottle. These elements 
are used to  automatically fly instrument approaches. 
The ATAS was designed to  fly according to the same 
rules and procedures that the pilot operates by in the 
present ATC system. An automatic missed approach 
is executed if the pilot does not assume control at 
the missed approach point. Finally, the ATAS was 
designed to accommodate the “real world” require- 
ment of frequent ATC radar vectoring to the final 
approach course. 
A simulated ATAS was developed and a research 
prototype was built in order to study a concept for 
improving the pilot interface with high levels of cock- 
pit automation and to evaluate pilot acceptance of 
such a system. Details of the simulated ATAS design 
and of its implementation into the Langley General 
Aviation Simulator are presented in reference 3. A 
piloted-simulation evaluation of the ATAS was then 
performed. This report presents the results of an 
evaluation that involved seven instrument-rated pi- 
lots, each flying four instrument approaches with 
the ATAS and four approaches with the baseline 
autopilot. The ATAS was well accepted by the pilots 
and the ATAS runs resulted in lower flight technical 
error and fewer pilot blunders than with the baseline 
autopilot. 
Abbreviations and Symbols 
Abbreviations 
ADF automatic direction finder 
identifier for Wakefield Municipal 
Airport 
AKQ 
ATAS 
ATC 
AUTO 
CDI 
CRT 
DME 
ECDI 
FREQ 
HSI 
IAF 
IFR 
I JS  
MANUAL 
MDA 
MSA 
NAV 
NDB 
NM 
OBS 
PHF 
SBY 
VLDS 
automatic terminal approach system 
air traffic control 
ATAS operating mode that uses stored 
approach data to automatically guide 
the aircraft 
course-deviation indicator 
cathode-ray tube 
distance measuring equipment 
electronic course-deviation indicator 
navigation receiver radio frequency 
horizontal-situation indicator 
initial approach fix 
instrument flight rules 
instrument landing system 
ATAS operating mode that uses 
manually input parameters to guide 
the aircraft 
minimum descent altitude for non- 
precision approach 
minimum safe altitude 
VOR navigation receiver 
nondirectional beacon 
nautical mile 
omnibearing selector 
identifier for Patrick Henry Interna- 
tional Airport 
standby mode 
visual landing display system 
VOR very high frequency omnirange 
Symbols 
h airplane barometric altitude 
h 
V airplane airspeed 
$ airplane heading angle 
Test Equipment and Procedures 
time rate of change of barometric altitude 
Airplane Simulation 
The current study was performed using the Lang- 
ley General Aviation Simulator. This research simu- 
lator consists of an enclosed cockpit (fig. 1)  interfaced 
to a general-purpose digital computer. The cockpit is 
fully enclosed by the cabin section of a light-airplane 
fuselage. The simulator instrumentation and avion- 
ics are typical of an IFR-equipped high-performance 
single-engine or light twin-engine airplane. They in- 
clude an HSI, dual VOR receivers, an ADF, and a 
two-axis autopilot. An array of speakers provide re- 
alistic wind and engine noise up to volumes typical of 
general aviation airplanes. The control yoke (elevator 
and ailerons) is hydraulically loaded to provide the 
force feel is supplied with springs. This simulator a 
has been used for related studies in automation and 
displays (ref. 2) .  
A mathematical model for a typical high-wing, 
four-seat, single-engine, general aviation airplane was 
used in the ATAS simulation. This model included 
changes in flight-control effectiveness and force gra- 
dients as a function of airspeed, wing-flap-extension 
effects, an atmospheric wind-turbulence model, and a 
radio navigation-aid data base. A landing gear model 
permitted touchdown and roll-out. 
The simulation navigation-aid data base (ref. 4) 
permits definition of a real navigation environment 
so that a subject pilot can fly cross-country flights 
and conduct instrument approaches by using stan- 
dard instrument charts. This data base includes the 
location, Morse code audio identifier, and frequency, 
as applicable, of VOR, DME, NDB, marker beacon, 
localizer, and glide-slope transmitters. 
The simulator is interfaced with a graphics com- 
puter and a visual landing display system (VLDS). 
The graphics computer provides the capability to 
simulate advanced displays or alphanumeric data on 
cockpit cathode-ray tubes (CRT’s). The VLDS uses 
a 1:750 scale terrain model and a closed-circuit tele- 
vision to provide an out-the-windshield view during 
approach and landing. Realistic cloud-breakout and 
low-visibility effects are also provided. 
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appropriate variable force gradients. Rudder-pedal 1 
Experimental System 
The ATAS concept was designed to manage an 
airplane autopilot, an autothrottle, and navigation 
radios for the pilot during an instrument approach 
from terminal area entry to the missed approach 
point and, if necessary, through the missed approach. 
The ATAS performed this management task on the 
basis of stored instrument approach data for each 
of the approaches to be flown. The purpose of this 
ATAS was to provide a means to study a concept for 
improving the pilot interface with high levels of cock- 
pit automation. This interface improvement concept 
was intended to  reduce the number of avionics system 
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inputs (i.e., navigation radio tuning and autopilot 
mode changes) and the throttle control required of 
the pilot during an approach, to improve situational 
status feedback to the pilot, and to reduce the pos- 
sibility that pilot distraction or chart misinterpreta- 
tion could cause a deviation from the correct flight 
path. This section briefly describes the experimental 
hardware and its operation. The ATAS hardware, 
software, and operation are described in detail in 
reference 3. 
The additional simulator hardware required for 
the ATAS simulation consisted of a control panel 
located above the existing autopilot controls. (See 
figs. 2 and 3.) Pilot input to the ATAS consists 
of an off-standby-on switch, push buttons to engage 
go-around and holding pattern features, automatic- 
manual mode-select push buttons for course and 
altitude guidance, course- and altitude-select knobs, 
and an on-off push button and a speed-select knob 
for the autothrottle. 
Output of information to the pilot is presented on 
a CRT (fig. 4). Areas along the left edge of the CRT 
show the status of the course and altitude modes 
(automatic or manual), the commanded course and 
altitude, the autothrottle status, and the commanded 
airspeed. Areas along the top of the CRT illuminate 
to indicate when the go-around or the hold function 
is selected. The remaining area of the CRT displays 
an electronic course-deviation indicator (ECDI) and 
five lines of alphanumeric text. These lines of text 
indicate the progress of the approach (e.g., beginning 
descent, final approach, or entering holding pattern), 
altitude deviations, direction and distance to the 
airport, the current autopilot status, and the name 
of the approach for which data are stored. 
Operation of the off-standby-on switch controls 
the state of the ATAS and its interface with other 
simulated aircraft systems. The standby state is 
intended to be used to enter approach data prior 
to entering the terminal area. Since this study 
was concerned with terminal area use of ATAS, no 
provisions for approach data entry were made and 
the standby state was not evaluated. Figure 5 shows 
the interface between the ATAS and other cockpit 
systems when the ATAS is switched on. In this state, 
the ATAS controls the tuning of the ADF, the DME, 
and the NAV 1. The positions of the autopilot mode- 
select knob and the HSI heading bug are ignored 
in this state. This was not the desired method of 
handling the mode-select knob and heading bug, but 
rather was a compromise required by the simulation 
hardware. 
When the ATAS is turned on, the course and 
altitude functions are activated in manual mode at 
the actual heading and altitude. If the autopilot 
heading channel is off, then the indicated heading 
on the ATAS display tracks the airplane heading and 
movement of the course knob has no effect. If the 
autopilot heading channel is on, then the heading 
indicated on the ATAS display is the airplane head- 
ing at the moment the ATAS was switched on; the 
course knob can be used to dial in new headings, and 
the ATAS commands the autopilot to follow the in- 
dicated heading. The ATAS altitude function follows 
the same rules as the course function for altitude ini- 
tialization and autopilot interaction. At the moment 
that both the ATAS and the autopilot altitude chan- 
nel attain on-status, the airplane altitude is latched 
into the ATAS display and held by the autopilot. The 
pilot may then dial a new altitude with the ATAS 
altitude-select knob, and the airplane will go to that 
new altitude. 
When the course and altitude functions are in 
the manual mode, the airplane maintains pilot- 
commanded headings and altitudes. The pilot 
switches course and altitude between manual and au- 
tomatic modes with the mode-select push buttons. 
The automatic mode commands' the ATAS to use 
the stored approach data and internal logic to com- 
plete the approach. The pilot may put the course 
function in automatic mode, provided the autopilot 
heading channel is on and the approach data have 
been stored. The altitude function may be placed in 
automatic mode, provided the course function is in 
automatic mode and the autopilot altitude channel 
is on. If the pilot attempts to place either function in 
the automatic mode when the required conditions are 
false, then no action or warnings take place. If the 
course function is switched from automatic to man- 
ual mode, then the altitude function also reverts to 
manual mode. This software interlock between the 
course and the altitude is designed to prevent un- 
desired climbs or descents while the airplane is being 
vectored near or across published approach segments. 
The go-around button above the CRT can be used 
to instruct the ATAS to discontinue descent while 
on the final approach course. Pressing this button 
while on final approach illuminates an annunciator 
on the CRT (fig. 4) and stops the airplane descent. 
The airplane then proceeds to the missed approach 
point and executes the missed approach procedure. 
Pressing the go-around button while not on final 
approach produces no effect. 
The hold button is used to instruct the ATAS to 
enter the next published holding pattern along the 
airplane flight path. When this mode is selected, an 
annunciation illuminates on the CRT. Pressing the 
button when the mode is on turns the mode off and 
inhibits holding-pattern entry. 
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The autothrottle is activated by pressing the on- 
off button and dialing in the commanded airspeed 
in knots. At the moment that the autothrottle 
is activated, the actual airspeed of the aircraft is 
latched as the commanded speed. This prevents any 
throttle transients upon activation. The autothrottle 
can be shut off by pressing the on-off button again, 
by turning the ATAS off, or by manually moving the 
throttle level to the idle position. 
Both the hold mode and the autothrottle are au- 
tomatically switched on by the ATAS at the begin- 
ning of a missed approach. This enables the ATAS 
to enter the missed approach holding pattern with- 
out further pilot input and prevents the airplane from 
slowing to a dangerously low airspeed as the climb is 
begun. The pilot can turn the modes off again if 
desired. 
Several compromises were necessary in the im- 
plementation of the ATAS in the simulator. The 
throttle in the cockpit was not back-driven by the 
autothrottle system because of the absence of ser- 
vos. An autothrottle term was simply added to 
the throttle position term in the software when 
the autothrottle was on. Also, the simulator was 
equipped with radio controls with mechanical drum- 
type frequency displays that had to be manually 
moved. It was, therefore, necessary for ATAS radio 
tuning to be simulated in the software by ignoring the 
manually selected radio frequency. This was compen- 
sated for by displaying the ATAS-selected navigation 
frequency with the ECDI on the ATAS CRT. Finally, 
the heading bug and the course select on the HSI 
could not be servo driven. This was compensated 
for by also displaying the ATAS-selected heading and 
course on the CRT. 
Experiment Design 
The study used seven instrument-rated pilots 
with total flight times ranging from 250 to 7000 hr. 
The average total flight time was 2074 hr. A pro- 
fessional test pilot and several instrument flight in- 
structors were included in the population. Table I 
lists the flight experience of each pilot. 
Each pilot was required to fly 2 hr of practice ap- 
proaches with the ATAS prior to any data runs. More 
practice was allowed if requested. The data runs con- 
sisted of eight instrument approaches for each pilot. 
The nondirectional beacon (NDB) approach of fig- 
ure 6 was used for four runs and the instrument land- 
ing system (ILS) approach of figure 7 was used for 
the other four runs. Two levels of autopilot com- 
plexity were used. In four runs (two NDB runs and 
two ILS runs), a baseline mode was used wherein 
the pilot flew the simdator in the longitudinal axis 
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and a heading-select lateral autopilot mode was en- 
gaged. The other four runs flown by each subject 
used the entire ATAS system. The baseline heading- 
select autopilot mode was chosen because, of the five 
levels of autopilot complexity tested in reference 2, it 
made the largest difference in decreasing work load. 
The NDB and ILS approaches were each flown 
with two different weather conditions as viewed on 
the outside visual scene. One weather condition was 
above the published minima for the approach and 
would allow visual breakout and landing provided the 
approach was properly executed. The other weather 
condition was below the published minima and was 
designed to cause a missed approach to be executed. 
Table I1 shows the published minima for the two 
approaches and the ceiling and visibility values used 
for the above- and below-minima conditions. No 
turbulence or wind was used in this study. 
Each pilot flew the eight possible combinations of 
approach type, autopilot level, and weather. Each 
pilot flew these approaches in a different sequence. 
Table I11 shows the sequence of runs for pilot A. 
A realistic ATC environment was simulated for 
the data runs. A remote X-Y plotter was labeled 
with runway, navigational aid, and approach path 
positions as well as locations where ATC vectors or 
altitude assignments should be given. A pseudocon- 
troller watching the airplane ground track in real 
time, and talking to the pilot by intercom, provided 
ATC interaction with the pilot. 
Each pilot was required to perform a side task in 
addition to  the instrument approach task. The sub- 
ject was given an EBB-type (circular slide rule) flight 
computer and asked to solve time-speed-distance 
problems. The subjects were told to solve the prob- 
lems at their own pace and not to allow the side task 
to interfere with the primary task. The same inter- 
com system used to simulate the ATC communica- 
tions was used to give side-task problems to the sub- 
ject and to record results. At the subject’s request, 
speed and distance for a problem were given. The 
subject reported the resulting time verbally. 
Data collected included side-task results by phase 
of approach, X-Y and X-Z plots of airplane path, 
pilot comments, researcher observations, strip-chart 
time histories of airplane Eulerian angles, altitude, 
vertical speed, airspeed, ILS deviations, and print- 
outs of airplane position and autopilot-ATAS states. 
The state printouts were triggered by changes in ap- 
proach phase, by changes in autopilot mode, or by 
pilot inputs to the ATAS. 
Results 
The data analysis primarily examined pilot blun- 
ders, pilot side-task measures, and pilot comments. 
The pilot blunders consisted of large flight-path devi- 
ations or researcher-observed errors in the operation 
of ATAS or autopilot controls. 
Pilot Blunders 
Pilot blunders were made during both the ATAS 
runs and the baseline heading-select autopilot runs. 
Fewer pilot blunders were made during the ATAS 
runs (11) than during the baseline runs (19). Two 
factors were predominant in the blunders committed 
with the ATAS. Of the 11 ATAS blunders, 9 involved 
“mode errors” or a lack of awareness of the present 
ATAS mode state or particular mode interactions. 
An example of a mode error is an attempt to se- 
lect an automatic ATAS mode while the autopilot is 
off. Another example of a mode error is shown in 
figure 8. In this case the altitude mode was in man- 
ual and the airplane was approaching the AKQ NDB 
from the southeast (fig. 6) when the pilot dialed in a 
new altitude to  begin a descent. During the descent, 
the pilot selected the automatic mode to begin an 
automatic approach. In this situation,.with the air- 
plane not yet established on a published approach 
segment, the ATAS logic will maintain the existing 
altitude. Rather than continue down to the pilot- 
selected altitude, the ATAS stopped the descent. The 
pilot reselected the manual altitude mode, reentered 
the desired altitude, then reselected the automatic 
mode. This cycle repeated until the airplane passed 
the NDB and was, therefore, established on a pub- 
lished approach segment. Switching to the automatic 
mode then had the desired effect of causing descent 
to the initial approach altitude. 
The second predominant factor in the ATAS pilot 
blunders was a lack of awareness of the airplane state 
or flight path. This was involved in four of the ATAS 
pilot blunders. Examples include the pilot forgetting 
to retract the wing flaps during an ATAS-executed 
automatic missed approach, and the pilot dialing in 
a heading of 060’ on the ATAS when ATC gave a 
vector of 160’. The error had to be called to the 
attention of the pilot by ATC. 
The 19 blunders during the baseline runs primar- 
ily involved 3 factors. The first factor, a lack of 
airplane or positional situational awareness, was in- 
volved in 11 blunders. Examples include turning the 
wrong direction in a holding pattern, flying through 
the localizer path and failing to intercept it, inad- 
vertently descending below decision height and land- 
ing with cloud ceiling below minima, and failing to 
descend promptly on a NDB final approach which 
resulted in a missed approach. The second factor, 
misinterpretation of navigation instrument indica- 
tions, was a factor in seven of the blunders. Ex- 
amples include momentary misinterpretation of the 
ADF indicator during NDB approaches and misinter- 
pretation of the HSI while holding on a localizer back 
course. The third factor, input error, was present in 
three of the blunders. Examples include mistuned 
navigation radios and commanding a turn in the 
wrong direction when the autopilot heading bug was 
used to make turns of 180’. One of the baseline- 
run pilot blunders involved misinterpretation of the 
instrument approach chart. 
Pilot Side-Task Measures 
The pilots were given a self-paced side task in an 
attempt to determine the relative work load between 
the ATAS and baseline runs. The side task was to 
solve time-speed-distance problems with a circular 
slide-rule-type computer. The problems were given 
verbally upon pilot request and the answers were 
reported verbally by the pilot. 
Figure 9 shows the means and the standard devi- 
ations of the total number of correct answers given 
by all pilots as a function of initial or final approach, 
ATAS or baseline data run, and NDB or ILS ap- 
proach. Initial approach is defined as the entire data 
run prior to intercepting the final approach course. 
The final approach is that portion of the data run 
after interception of the final approach course and 
terminates at landing or at the beginning of a missed 
approach. The number of correct side-task answers 
cannot be compared directly between the NDB and 
ILS runs because of the different times required to fly 
the different path lengths, but comparisons between 
baseline and ATAS runs are valid. The side-task 
measure did not discriminate a difference in work 
load between use of the baseline autopilot and the 
ATAS. 
Pilot Comments 
The pilot comments were interpreted with respect 
to the ATAS controls, the ATAS display, and the 
pilot interaction with ATAS operating procedures. 
The control-related comments were further divided 
into the physical operation of the given controls 
and the way the controls were integrated with the 
autopilot. The only problems with the physical 
operation of the controls were related to the scaling 
of the course- and altitude-select knobs and to the 
placement of the controls. The course-select knob 
changed the course 360’ for each revolution of the 
knob. This was judged to be too sensitive and made 
accurate setting of headings difficult. The altitude- 
select knob changed the selected altitude 400 ft for 
each revolution. This rate was judged to be too small 
and made setting new altitudes time consuming. 
Finally, placement of the knobs to the left of the 
display caused the pilot’s right hand to obstruct the 
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view of the display when the course-, altitude-, or 
speed-select knobs were used. 
With respect to the integration of the ATAS con- 
trols, numerous comments indicated that the ATAS 
and autopilot controls should be integrated into one 
system rather than be designed as two separate units. 
One pilot suggested putting an “ATAS” position on 
the autopilot mode-select knob. Related comments 
suggested that the HSI heading bug, which is a com- 
ponent of the basic autopilot but is not a component 
of AT.4S, be servo-driven to correspond to the head- 
ing selected with ATAS controls. As presently imple- 
mented, the pilots used different controls to control a 
given parameter, such as heading, depending on the 
level of automation used. 
The display-related comments indicated that suf- 
ficient information was present to maintain awareness 
of the progress of the approach, but as the system is 
implemented, more information concerning the op- 
eration of the avionics would be helpful. The pilots 
believed that the constant display of distance and 
direction to the airport was beneficial. One pilot in- 
dicated a preference for displaying direction from the 
airport rather than direction to the airport. Another 
pilot indicated that all the necessary information was 
present. This comment was corroborated by two in- 
cidents during data runs when the ATAS failed. In 
each case the pilot quickly detected the failure, dis- 
engaged the ATAS, and continued the flight without 
apparent difficulty. Other pilot comments indicated a 
desire for additional information. Examples include 
display of the time to airport, annunciation of in- 
tersection passage, indications that a valid naviga- 
tion signal is being received, and an indication that 
the final vector to an ILS will intercept the local- 
izer. With respect to the operation of the avionics 
system, the comments indicated that more prompt- 
ing was needed to assist the pilot. For example, as 
implemented, if the pilot attempted to select an au- 
tomatic ATAS mode with the autopilot off, the ATAS 
simply ignored the input. The pilots indicated that 
in this instance the ATAS should have advised the 
pilot that the autopilot was off. Finally, one pilot 
expressed a concern that putting too much informa- 
tion on the CRT may draw the pilots’ attention away 
from the basic flight instruments. 
With respect to pilot interaction with ATAS op- 
erating procedures, the pilots commented on the 
AUTO-MANUAL mode labeling and operation. 
Some comments indicated that the labels AUTO and 
MANIJAL were confusing. Some questioned whether 
MANUAL was to be used for manual flying of the air- 
plane or for manual operation of autopilot controls. 
It was actually for manual input, on the ATAS panel, 
of headings, altitudes, and speeds to fly, Likewise, 
comments indicated that the meaning of the AUTO 
label was not obvious. One pilot, in fact, occasionally 
selected the AUTO mode in an attempt to automat- 
ically fly a heading that had been manually dialed in 
on the ATAS panel. 
Regardless of the mode labeling, the pilots indi- 
cated confusion about the operation of the modes. 
One pilot indicated uncertainty about when the full 
comment indicated that the system worked well once 
everything was in automatic, but that going from 
fully manual to fully automatic was awkward. This 
is consistent with one pilot’s request that it be pos- 
sible to put all modes into automatic with the press 
of one button. 
Pilot comments indicated that understanding the 
control mode operations was further complicated by 
a difference in the transition from manual to auto- 
matic in the heading and altitude channels. When 
the heading channel was switched from manual to 
automatic, it maintained the last heading dialed in 
until the airplane intercepted a published approach 
path. The altitude channel, however, when switched 
from manual to automatic when not on an approach 
segment, maintained the present altitude regardless 
of the last altitude dialed in. The pilots indicated 
that the altitude channel should have operated the 
same as the heading channel. Implementation of this 
suggestion would have probably eliminated some of 
the blunders that occurred (see fig. 8) when the pilot 
dialed in a new altitude just prior to selecting the 
automatic mode. 
& 
‘I automation capabilities should be selected. Another 
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Closing Discussion 
Several important trends can be observed in the 
data. The higher level of automation both reduced 
the frequency of pilot blunders and changed the na- 
ture of the blunders that did occur. The reduction 
in the frequency of blunders contradicts the results 
of reference 2, wherein pilot blunders increased with 
higher levels of automation. This discrepancy could 
be due to several factors. The autopilot interface in 
reference 2 removed the pilot from the normal air- 
plane control loop, but required manipulation of nu- 
merous avionics controls as the airplane was maneu- 
vered for the approach. Little feedback concerning 
the approach or avionics status was provided by that 
autopilot system. The ATAS also removed the pi- 
lot from the airplane control loop. The ATAS then 
took care of the detailed manipulation of avionics 
controls, provided approach and system status infor- 
mation to the pilot, and simplified speed control with 
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the autothrottle. It is possible that the pilots com- 
mitted fewer blunders simply because they had fewer 
opportunities to do so. 
The change in nature of the blunders commit- 
ted in this study can be tracked to the different 
systems that the pilot controlled. With the base- 
line autopilot, the blunders were mostly associated 
with lack of navigational situational awareness and 
with instrument and chart misinterpretation. With 
ATAS, very few blunders were associated with navi- 
gational situational awareness, but instead most were 
associated with the operation of the various automa- 
tion modes. It is possible, however, that the pilots’ 
navigational situational awareness was lower with 
ATAS than without it, but this lack of awareness did 
not introduce blunders because of the high level of 
automation. 
Probably the most important observation from 
the data is related to the ability of the pilots to form a 
“mental model” of system operation. Many of the pi- 
lots’ comments and blunders indicate problems with 
the integration of the ATAS with the autopilot and 
other avionics. Pilots commented that the autopilot 
and ATAS should be one system. The pilots were 
sometimes confused about when the ATAS modes 
should be switched from manual to automatic. Com- 
ments were received that more prompts should be 
provided by ATAS. These comments are all related 
to the understanding, or mental model, of the system 
operat ion. 
The adequacy of the pilots’ mental model could 
possibly be improved in several ways. One is to 
simplify the system that must be learned. In some 
cases, the input of the same parameter to the ATAS 
autopilot, such as heading, was made with different 
controls depending on the level of automation in use. 
As previously noted, an inconsistency of operation 
was present with respect to the behavior of the course 
and altitude features when they were switched from 
manual to automatic. Integrating the autopilot and 
ATAS controls and improving consistency of system 
operation might simplify the system. 
A second way to improve the adequacy of the 
mental model is with prompting. Prompting would 
not improve pilot understanding or simplify the sys- 
tem, but it could bridge the gap when system com- 
plexity exceeds the pilots’ understanding or ability 
to monitor all aspects of system operation. In this 
study, suggestions were received that the ATAS pro- 
vide prompting when certain inappropriate inputs 
were made. 
A third possible, but much less desirable, way to 
improve the pilots’ mental model is through increased 
training and practice. Pilots must have enough train- 
ing on a system to understand the basic principles of 
operation and to learn the operational details and 
possible “traps” that exist with many systems. Pi- 
lot comments about uncertainty of the purpose of 
the ATAS iiiariual and automatic modes, and related 
blunders, indicate that more training may have com- 
pensated for deficiencies in the ATAS pilot-machine 
interface design. 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23665-5225 
February 12, 1987 
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Table I. Pilot Flight Experience 
Pilot 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Total flight time, hr IFR flight time, hr 
250 63 
370 55 
600 100 
1600 140 
1700 400 
3000 400 
7000 1500 
Table 111. Run Sequence for Pilot A 
Parameter 
Minimum ceiling, f t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Minimum visibility, mi . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Above-minima case-ceiling, ft/visibility, mi . . . . .  
Below-minima case-ceiling, ft/visibility, mi . . . . .  
ILS approach NDB approach 
200 727 
0.5 1 
300/ 1 .O 830/1.5 
110/1.0 630/1.5 
8 
Run ATAS Approach 
1 Off NDB 
2 On NDB 
3 On ILS 
4 Off NDB 
5 On ILS 
6 Off ILS 
7 On NDB 
8 Off ILS 
number state type 
Weather condition 
relative to minima 
Below 
Above 
Below 
Above 
Above 
Below 
Below 
Above 
Table 11. Approach Minima and Simulated Weather Conditions 
9 
Figure 2. ATAS control and display panel. 
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Figure 3. ATAS installation in Langley General Aviation Simulator. 
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